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Abstract 
 
Information asymmetries make it difficult for banks to assess accurately whether 
specific entrepreneurs are able and/or willing to repay their loans. This leads to 
implicit interest rate ceilings, i.e. banks “refuse” to increase their interest rates 
beyond this ceiling as this would lower their net returns. Although the maximum 
interest rate increases as the size of enterprises decreases, such ceilings nonetheless 
constrain the banks’ ability to set interest rates at a level that would enable them to 
cover costs. If transaction costs are high, the total costs associated with granting 
small and medium-sized loans will exceed the maximum average return which the 
banks can earn by issuing such loans. For this reason, banks do not lend to small 
and medium-sized enterprises, and, as a consequence, these businesses have no 
access to formal sector loans.  
Because micro and small enterprises have a very high RoI, it is worthwhile for 
them to rely on expensive informal loans to finance their operations, at least until 
they reach a certain size. Once they have reached this size, however, it does not 
make economic sense for them to continue taking out informal credits, and thus they 
face a growth constraint imposed by the credit market. Medium-sized enterprises 
earn a lower RoI than small ones, which is why borrowing in the informal credit 
market is not a worthwhile option for them. Moreover, they do not have access to 
credit from formal financial institutions, and are thus excluded from obtaining any 
kind of financing in either of the two credit markets.  
As the result of free, unregulated market forces we get a stable equilibrium in 
which the credit market is segmented into an informal (small loan) segment, a formal 
(large loan) segment and, in between, a “non-market” (medium loan) segment. 
 
 
 Introduction 
In most developing countries, large segments of the population live in poverty. They work 
in informal small or micro enterprises which must rely on extremely expensive informal 
loans, as they do not have access to formal sector bank loans to meet their financing require-
ments. Because capital is expensive, the operations of such enterprises are highly labour 
intensive, and labour productivity is low; thus, wages in the informal sector are also very low.  
Developing countries also have a modern, formal sector which operates parallel to the 
informal sector and which, by comparison, enjoys a good supply of relatively cheap capital, 
high labour productivity, and high wage rates. Large factor price differentials create a wide 
gap between rich and poor in these countries, although they do not, as traditional economic 
theory predicts, lead to a high degree of factor mobility, which would tend to reduce 
differences in factor prices. 
Economic theory has so far been unable to explain why it is that, even in countries where 
far-reaching liberalisation has made markets relatively competitive, factor markets remain 
segmented. For lack of a better explanation, the refusal on the part of formal financial 
institutions to offer small loans to informal-sector enterprises has been justified by pointing to 
interest rate ceilings1 (which in the meantime have been largely eliminated) or asymmetric 
information problems.2 However, banks also seldom lend even to medium-sized enterprises. 
Moreover, the interest rate differentials between the smallest bank loans and the largest 
informal loans are striking. At present, there is no clear explanation as to why no formal 
institutions have been established to bridge this gap by offering loans which are smaller than 
those available from banks at somewhat higher interest rates than those charged by banks. If 
such institutions existed, credit market segmentation would not occur. Instead, there would be 
a continuum of lending rates which would be a function of the intermediation costs and loan 
amounts involved in each case. 
This paper addresses the question why credit market segmentation occurs. Are there 
“compelling” factors which make its existence inevitable? Under what conditions does 
segmentation occur? 
To facilitate answering this question, “enterprise size” is explicitly incorporated as a 
dimension of the analysis. Rather than making the typical distinction between “large” and 
“small” enterprises, this paper assumes a continuum of possible sizes. On the one hand, this 
will enable us to describe more clearly the causes of credit rationing and credit market seg-
mentation; on the other, it will lay the conceptual groundwork which will be used to illustrate 
why there are no institutions which cater for the demand of “medium-sized” borrowers. 
                                                 
1   Cf. GONZÁLEZ-VEGA, 1984. 
2   Cf. e.g. VON PISCHKE, 1991.  
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In the following analysis all issues relating to lending are invariably viewed from the 
perspective of the credit institutions, as they are the limiting side of the market. Unless 
explicitly defined otherwise, the “total costs of the bank” and their components are invariably 
understood to be the costs of lending expressed as a percentage of the loan amount. 
The first section contains a presentation of the basic model and the assumptions on which 
it is based. The second section examines how banks respond when information asymmetries 
prevent them from making a relatively reliable estimate of the ability of individual borrowers 
to repay their loans. Both sections form the basis for the derivation of a credit supply function 
of banks in the third section. The fourth section explores the banks’ response to the possible 
or purported unwillingness of borrowers to pay, i.e. a modification of the bank credit supply 
function. This function will be compared with the supply function of informal lenders to 
demonstrate why credit market segmentation inevitably occurs. 
1.  The basic model and its underlying assumptions 
It is often observed that the RoI of an enterprise depends on its size. The RoI of very large 
enterprises is relatively low because there are virtually no restrictions on the international 
mobility of capital for large-scale projects, and yield advantages are quickly noticed by other 
market participants, who then take steps to exploit such advantages for themselves.3 In 
contrast, smaller enterprises can move into, and develop, narrow market niches without 
attracting too many direct competitors on the same scale, as capital restrictions and high 
capital costs usually restrain the scope of activity for small, informal enterprises. This in turn 
enables them to achieve higher returns than those earned by large enterprises. In addition, in 
nearly all developing countries the opportunity cost of (unskilled) labour is very low. As a 
result, informal enterprises produce with very high labour intensity and their RoI is therefore 
extremely high. It can exceed 100 percent per month. 
This is shown in figure 1 derived from empirical studies on the return on investment of 
borrowers of Caja Los Andes, Bolivia.4 The data presented here are not corrected for any 
entrepreneurial salaries because it is difficult or impossible to estimate an appropriate salary. 
Therefore, the average return on investment shown here might be misleading. For this reason, 
the marginal return on investment is depicted as well, showing that increases in total assets 
yield high but decreasing returns. 
 
                                                 
3   This may be different in certain high-tech sectors such as computer chip production or the software or 
aircraft industries, owing to high market entry barriers. In the majority of “developing country industries”, 
however, businesses wishing to produce the goods supplied by most “large enterprises” do not face 
especially high market entry barriers. 
4   Cf. JUNGBLUTH, 1999.  
 
3
Fig. 1:  The empirical relationship between RoI and enterprise size 
These observations form the point of departure for the following analysis. It will be 
assumed that an enterprise’s RoI decreases as its size increases. The total assets of an 
enterprise will be taken as a measure of its size. For the sake of simplicity we will assume a 
linear RoI-function as shown in Figure 2, using a logarithmic scale for the X-axis.  
 
Fig. 2:  The (assumed) relationship between RoI and enterprise size 
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As the next step, we must determine the costs which banks incur by lending to enterprises 
of various sizes.5 It is assumed that the size of loan demanded by an enterprise is proportional 
to its size.6 Because certain transaction costs are fixed – i.e. they have no relationship to the 
size of the loan disbursed – the banks’ costs of lending, expressed as a percentage of the loan 
amount, are higher for small credits than for larger ones. The risk-related costs (likewise 
expressed as a percentage of the loan amount) are also higher for small borrowers than for 
larger ones, not because their business activities inherently involve higher risk – indeed, the 
opposite is true – but rather because conventional banks, with their traditional procedures, are 
not able to assess accurately the risk inherent in lending to such enterprises, which typically 
do not even keep written accounts. The purpose of a given loan has no bearing on the bank’s 
funding costs, which are thus the same for all loans.  
 
Fig. 3:  The costs of lending for banks 
                                                 
5   The perspective of the enterprise is analysed in the annex of the paper. 
6   Indeed, it has been observed that small and micro enterprises finance a far larger share of their “balance 
sheet total” internally than do large enterprises. For the sake of simplicity, in the following it will be 
assumed that all enterprises have the same capital ratio. If the lower capital ratios of large enterprises were 
taken into account in the analysis, there would be no qualitative change, and the quantitative effects would 
be amplified.  
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Figure 3 above shows the costs of lending incurred by banks (expressed as a percentage of 
the loan amount) as a function of the size of the loan, and thus of the enterprise size. First, the 
banks’ variable and fixed transaction costs must be added to the funding rate, i
fund
for . The 
transaction costs for small loan amounts can be extremely high because the loans in question 
are enterprise loans. Micro entrepreneurs usually do not qualify for other types of credit such 
as personal loans or overdraft facilities on current accounts, and thus have no choice but to 
take out enterprise loans, which are more costly for banks to grant. The relevant risk costs 
have also been taken into account. 
The uppermost curve represents the costs of lending for banks as a function of the size of 
the loans or of the size of the borrowing enterprises. In other words, if banks lend at the 
interest rates on this curve, they will only just be able to cover their costs. As a consequence, 
bank credits would be available to, and attractive for, all enterprises for which the RoI lies 
above the cost curve of the banks and therefore enterprises larger than A and smaller than B. 
Such an allocation of credit would also be efficient at the macro-economic level. 
This model illustrates clearly the effects of statutory interest rate ceilings (Figure 4).7 For 
example, if the government introduces an interest rate ceiling of i legal
max , enterprises will only be 
eligible to borrow if they generate costs of less than ilegal
max  for the banks, which means they 
must be at least as large as SE for
min. All enterprises smaller than SE for
min are subject to credit 
rationing because the banks would lose money by lending to these businesses at an interest 
rate of i legal
max . This is worthy of note in particular because the larger enterprises in this segment 
show the greatest spread between RoI and capital costs; i.e. from a macro-economic point of 
view they make the most efficient use of the capital available to them. 
Thus, an area emerges within the credit market (area DBE) in which a loan contract is of 
absolute advantage for all participants (henceforth, this area will be referred to as the 
“contract area”). A contract on one of the boundaries will enable only one party to realise the 
maximum possible return, while the other party remains indifferent. For an enterprise of a 
given size, the greater the vertical distance between the “contract point” and the respective 
party’s cost function or yield point, the higher the profits for that party will be. If this distance 
is multiplied by the loan amount (a function of the size of the enterprise), the result is the 
absolute profit for each party to the contract. The graph illustrates that an interest rate ceiling 
has no influence on the lending rates offered to large enterprises, whereas for smaller 
enterprises which have not been subject to credit rationing, such a ceiling causes the “profit 
distribution” to shift in favour of the enterprises. 
 
                                                 
7   For a simplified explanation cf. GONZÁLEZ-VEGA, 1984.  
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Fig. 4:  The effect of legal interest rate restrictions 
In the course of the past decades, legal maximum interest rates have been eliminated in 
nearly all countries. Nonetheless, experience has shown that banks usually do not raise their 
interest rates beyond a certain limit, preferring instead to avoid lending to small enterprises. 
The reasons for this will be discussed in the following sections. 
2.  The ability to pay and information asymmetries 
This section analyses the impact of information asymmetries on the credit supply provided 
by banks. Using the STIGLITZ/WEISS (1981) model, it will first be demonstrated that – like 
statutory regulations – asymmetric information can lead to a situation in which it would be 
detrimental to the banks if they were to raise interest rates above a certain level. As a result, 
the pricing mechanism which could serve to clear the markets is rendered ineffective. In the 
second part of the section, several highly restrictive assumptions of the STIGLITZ/WEISS model 
are relaxed; the revised model is then used to derive the banks’ response to information 
asymmetries, especially as regards pricing and rationing.   
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a)  The STIGLITZ/WEISS model 
This sub-section contains a brief summary of the key arguments presented in the article by 
STIGLITZ and WEISS (1981). A detailed derivation of the results will not be presented here.8 
Figure 5 summarises the basic features of the STIGLITZ/WEISS model.9 The third quadrant 
represents a savings function in which it is assumed that there is a positive correlation 
between savings volume (S) and the interest rate on savings deposits (r
s). However, there 
would be no fundamental change in the results even if the savings volume were completely 
inelastic with respect to interest rates. The return on the banks’ lending activities (r) must be 
at least as high as the deposit interest rate. For the sake of simplicity, these two variables are 
assumed to be equal and in the following are represented by the same symbol (r). In the 
second quadrant, the savings volume is merely transposed into the first quadrant, where it 
represents the credit supply.10 
 
Fig. 5:  The central implications of STIGLITZ/WEISS (1981) 
                                                 
8   In addition to STIGLITZ/WEISS, 1981, see TSCHACH, 1995, for a more detailed derivation. 
9   Cf. STIGLITZ/WEISS, 1981. 
10   Owing to the multiplier effect, the banks can lend amounts which are a multiple of their deposits. However, 
because the multiplier is an exogenous factor and thus a constant, the result is merely a bubble which is 
assumed to be already contained in the savings function shown on the graph.  
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The first and fourth quadrants are of key importance. The fourth quadrant shows the banks’ 
return (r) as a function of the contracted lending interest rate (i). Proceeding from the 
assumption of asymmetric information distribution between lender and borrower, STIGLITZ 
and WEISS show, on the one hand, that when lending interest rates go up, low-risk borrowers 
do not (cannot) implement their projects. On the other hand, for borrowers who continue to 
implement projects, rising interest rates provide an incentive to invest in increasingly risky 
projects. The banks must bear part of the risk, which is reflected in their returns: While the 
straight line in the fourth quadrant describes a relationship between r and i which would apply 
if there were no credit risk for the bank (r = i), r(i) represents the relationship which is in fact 
relevant for the bank.  STIGLITZ and  WEISS have shown that when interest rates increase 
beyond a certain rate (i
max), the banks’ returns must decrease. 
The first quadrant plots the credit supply of the banks, which is derived through simple 
transposition in a four-quadrant system (unlike typical representations of supply and demand, 
the position of the axes here has been reversed). Although there is a point at which credit 
supply and credit demand intersect (B), this point represents an interest rate which is higher 
than i
max (C). The banks are not willing to charge such high rates, because in doing so they 
would reduce their returns. Thus, they will disburse loans of Cr
max at the interest rate of 
exactly i
max. By “refusing” to charge higher interest rates (i.e. prices), which would in turn 
reduce the demand which exists at i
max, the banks render the market mechanism ineffective: 
The existing excess demand for funds cannot be absorbed by higher prices, but instead 
remains at the level plotted in the graph. 
From this analysis, it can be concluded that even without legal interest rate restrictions, 
information asymmetries can lead to “implicit” interest rate ceilings; this in turn prevents 
markets from clearing and leads to credit rationing. These effects are analogous to the impact 
of statutory interest rate ceilings. 
b)   Extensions of the STIGLITZ/WEISS model 
We shall now extend the STIGLITZ/WEISS model so as to make its assumptions compatible 
with those of the basic model. The assumptions of STIGLITZ and WEISS which are problematic 
in this respect are that a) all borrowers demand credit in equal amounts, b) all borrowers have 
the same expected RoI of their projects, and c) no transaction costs need be taken into 
account.  
These three assumptions shall now be relaxed. Depending on their size, enterprises achieve 
different RoIs, demand loans of varying size, and generate varying transaction cost levels 
expressed as a share of the loan amount. How do these changes affect the model as depicted 
above?  
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Owing to higher anticipated profits, an increase in an enterprise’s expected RoI will in 
principle have two effects: on the one hand, the risk borne by the banks at a given interest rate 
decreases (distance to the 45° line); on the other, the interest rate at which banks can 
maximise their returns, i
max, increases. As a result of these two effects, the return function for 
the banks, r(i), is extended downward and to the right.  
The level of the transaction costs incurred by the banks is not a function of the interest rate 
charged, and, as a result, factoring in transaction costs causes an upward parallel shift in the 
return function. 
Fig. 6 illustrates these effects separately for small and large loans. Small loans are granted 
to small enterprises with higher RoIs, and thus the gross return function of the banks which 
applies to them, r(i) gross
small, is relatively flat. However, this function does not yet take into 
account the banks’ transaction costs. Because transaction costs are relatively high for small 
loans, this causes a relatively strong upward shift in the return function. The net return of the 
banks, less transaction costs, is shown by the function r(i) net
small. 
The corresponding function for large loans is relatively compressed; the distance between 
this curve and the 45° line increases more than the function r(i) gross
small as the interest rate rises. 
However, because the banks’ transaction costs, expressed as a percentage of the loan amount, 
are significantly lower for large loans, the curve is not shifted upward as strongly; r(i) net
l e arg  is 
the function which represents the banks’ net return on large loans. 
 
Fig. 6:  The expanded STIGLITZ/WEISS model  
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Although the interest rate at which banks can maximise their return is substantially higher 
for small loans (i small
max ) than for large credits (i l e arg
max ), the banks’ return, r(i), is nonetheless 
higher for large loans. Banks’ return on small loans will only be comparable to what they can 
earn on large loans if the interest rate in the market for large loans is lower than i
crit. If this is 
the case, large loans would be granted at an interest rate of i
crit, while small borrowers would 
have to pay the much higher interest rate i small
max . It should be noted that despite the considerable 
difference in interest rates, the banks’ net return, r small
max , would be identical for both groups of 
borrowers. 
The credit supply curves transposed into the first quadrant require a great deal of interpre-
tation. The necessary analysis will be performed on the basis of the following graph. In Figure 
7, the conditions presumed above are combined with, and compared to, three possible credit 
demand functions for large borrowers. If the demand of large borrowers is equivalent to 
Cr l e
D
arg
2 , an interest rate higher than i
crit will result in this market segment, and at this rate for 
large loans, the banks’ net return is higher than the return they could earn in the small loan 
market. Therefore, the banks will only grant large loans, and completely ration credit to small 
borrowers. If the demand function for large loans is Cr l e
D
arg
3 , then even large borrowers will be 
subject to credit rationing, because demand will also exceed the maximum possible supply at 
an interest rate of i l e arg
max . 
 
Fig. 7:  The credit supply provided by banks according to the expanded 
STIGLITZ/WEISS model  
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Loans will not be offered to small borrowers at all unless the demand for large loans 
intersects the supply function at an interest rate below i
crit. In the case of the demand curve 
plotted here, Cr l e
D
arg
1 , the credit volume available to small borrowers would correspond to the 
difference between supply and demand in the large loan market at the interest rate of i
crit, 
which would be charged to large borrowers. The small loans would then carry an interest rate 
of i small
max . If the demand for small loans is larger than maxCr small
S , credit rationing would 
continue to occur in this market segment. Only if the demand is smaller than maxCr small
S  will 
interest rates decline for both small and large loans, and they will decline in such a way that 
the net return for the banks, r(i), is always the same in both segments of the market. 
Thus, we can distinguish between three market situations, each of which would have 
different consequences for small borrowers:  
1.  The demand for large loans causes interest rates in this market to rise above i
crit, and thus 
no small loans are granted. The banks earn a net return which is higher than r small
max . 
2.  In the market for large loans, demand intersects the supply function at an interest rate 
lower than i
crit. The banks nonetheless charge large borrowers an interest rate of i
crit; with 
the excess supply of funds from this market being lent to borrowers in the market for 
small loans at an interest rate of ismall
max . However, this excess supply diverted from the 
market for large loans is not sufficient to satisfy the demand in this market segment. 
Changes in supply or demand in the market for large loans have no impact whatsoever on 
conditions in this market; lending rates remain stable. However, given a constant interest 
rate of i small
max  for small loans, these changes will cause the credit supply in the market for 
small loans to fluctuate by precisely the same amount as the excess supply in the market 
for large loans. For example, if the demand for large loans were to increase by US$ 1 
million, the credit supply in the small-loan market would drop by exactly the same 
amount. In contrast, fluctuations in the demand for small loans will only affect the small-
loan market itself by varying the extent to which borrowers are subject to credit rationing. 
Thus, the market for small loans is dependent on the large-loan market. The banks realise 
a net return of exactly r small
max . 
3.  The demand for small loans at an interest rate of i small
max  is smaller than the excess supply in 
the large-loan market at an interest rate of i
crit. Credit rationing no longer takes place; the 
banks must accept a net return of less than r small
max . Fluctuations in demand in each of the 
two market segments now affect interest rates and the credit volume available in both 
segments, i.e. there is an interdependence between the two market segments.  
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3.  Pricing and rationing given asymmetric information 
The previous section has made statements with respect to credit rationing only insofar as 
two loan sizes are concerned. As this restriction could be misleading, it will now be 
eliminated. As this cannot be done on the basis of the STIGLITZ/WEISS model, the preliminary 
results derived in the previous section will now be incorporated into the basic model. 
As was shown, information asymmetries can lead to the emergence of implicit interest rate 
ceilings. Even in the absence of statutory regulations, these ceilings prevent banks from 
raising their interest rates beyond a certain level. However, the difference between implicit 
and statutory upper limits on interest rates is that the implicit ceilings are a function of the size 
of the borrowing enterprise. The smaller an enterprise, the higher its expected RoI, which, 
given a constant interest rate, reduces a bank’s risk costs. Therefore, the interest rates at which 
asymmetric information begins to have a negative impact on the banks’ net return are higher 
for small enterprises than for large ones. The implicit interest rate ceiling rises as the size of 
the enterprise decreases; this phenomenon is represented by an “interest rate ceiling function”, 
which is shown in Figure 8. 
 
Fig. 8:  The credit supply provided by banks under conditions of asymmetric 
information  
 
13
The banks must take into account the interest rate ceiling function i for
max, which plots the 
interest rate at which they can maximise their return for an enterprise of any given size. Banks 
will thus not charge interest rates which lie above this function, nor will they lend to 
enterprises for which the anticipated costs exceed revenues. They will only lend to enterprises 
for which the total costs curve lies below the interest rate ceiling function, which is the case 
for enterprises of a size ranging between SE for
min and SE for
max. All enterprises smaller than SE for
min 
will be subject to credit rationing. 
The contract area is represented by the figure DBE. The banks will attempt to lend at rates 
which correspond to the points on the segments DE and EB, because this is where they will 
realise the highest profits. For the enterprises, interest rates corresponding to points on the DB 
curve would be ideal. All points between these lines represent lending rates which make credit 
relationships profitable for both banks and enterprises; the lending rates that actually obtain 
will be a function of prevailing market conditions and the extent of competition in the 
financial sector. 
Thus, even if allowance is made for the dependence of the size of enterprises on their RoI, 
for transaction costs, and for the fact that there is a continuum of possible enterprise sizes, 
information asymmetries lead to implicit interest rate ceilings which prevent small and 
medium-sized enterprises from obtaining access to bank loans, despite the fact that their 
expected RoIs are higher (sometimes much higher) than the banks’ total costs. What is 
efficient for an individual economic unit thus leads to inefficiencies for the economy as a 
whole. 
4.  The willingness to pay 
If a loan is actually to be paid back, the borrower must not only be able, but also willing to 
pay. Yet why should borrowers wish to pay back their loans at all? The answer is simple: by 
repaying the loan, they will reap greater benefits than if they refuse to pay! In other words, 
they will only pay back their loans if it is advantageous for them to do so. 
But why should borrowers be better off if they pay back their loans? After all, this requires 
a considerable sacrifice. What exactly compels a borrower to repay his or her debts? 
The repayment of a loan can be motivated by intrinsic or extrinsic factors. In this context, 
intrinsic motivation means that borrowers pay back their loans because of their own attitudes, 
ethical considerations, personal relationships, etc., rather than because of economic 
considerations. Behaving otherwise would simply make them feel bad. In a broader sense, 
repaying a loan to avoid losing face is also a form of intrinsic motivation. Because borrowers’ 
actions are noted by other persons in their social environment, they must expect social 
sanctions for behaviour which does not comply with social norms. Intrinsic motivation will  
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be, however, disregarded in this analysis, as one can assume that micro entrepreneurs do not 
have any intrinsic motivation to repay a loan to a conventional bank.11 
There are two extrinsic factors which can motivate borrowers to repay their loans. On the 
one hand, they avoid costs that could arise if the bank attempted to force them to pay back 
their loans. On the other hand, they safeguard future benefits for themselves which can arise 
in the form of a continued business relationship with the bank, but which they will only be 
able to reap if the current credit has been repaid (intertemporal linkage). 
Of course, intertemporal linkage only “works” if borrowers can in fact assume that their 
co-operative behaviour will in fact induce their banks to grant them access to credit in the 
future. However, this is seldom the case. As was shown in Section 2, given constant interest 
rates, fluctuations in demand in the “large loan market” usually lead to corresponding 
fluctuations in supply on the “small loan market”. The same mechanism naturally applies to 
fluctuations in supply – e.g. as a result of measures taken by the central bank – to which 
commercial banks respond by “regulating” the supply of funds which they are willing to lend 
out in the form of very small loans; larger loans are usually affected only slightly, if at all. It 
has thus been observed in many countries that the supply of small credits, assuming such a 
supply exists at all, is subject to strong fluctuations. Consequently, small borrowers have 
learned in the past that timely repayment of all instalments does not guarantee their personal 
access to credit. Intertemporal linkage therefore provides little incentive for repayment of 
loans to conventional banks. 
As a consequence, the only remaining option for the banks is to make clear that they will 
force borrowers to fulfil their obligations by taking legal action. In many countries, however, 
the banking sector is subject to laws which are designed to protect borrowers and which grant 
creditors little scope for action. For them, initiating legal proceedings to collect their claims is 
a very lengthy and expensive process in which the costs of the legal measures often exceed 
the value of the small loans involved. In addition, if legal restrictions or a given borrower’s 
economic situation prevent the banks from passing on these legal costs to uncooperative 
borrowers, it makes little economic sense for them to enforce the repayment of loans through 
legal measures. Borrowers are also aware of this, and thus they would presumably have little, 
if any, extrinsic motivation to repay their loans. 
As a result, banks will not grant loans if the costs generated by potential legal proceedings 
would exceed the loan amount. The laws which are intended to protect borrowerss thus 
prevent them from receiving access to credit in the first place. The more expensive it is for the 
banks to enforce the repayment of loans through legal action, the higher the “minimum loan 
amount” will be. 
                                                 
11   For an analysis of intrinsic motivation in the context of credit rationing, cf. TSCHACH, 2002, pp. 19–24.  
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Figure 9 shows how these considerations can be incorporated into the results of the 
preceding analysis. Assumed that the costs which banks incur by taking legal action to 
enforce payment (the costs of foreclosure and liquidation of collateral) are equal to the size of 
the loan demanded by enterprises with a size of SE* for
min, this will be the minimumsize of 
enterprises to qualify for bank loans. Thus, these loans would still be larger than the minimum 
loan amount which would emerge as a consequence of information asymmetries and the 
accompanying lack of opportunities to accurately assess the borrowers’ ability to pay back 
their loans (SE for
min).12 
 
 
Fig. 9:  Costs of foreclosure and liquidation of collateral and the credit supply of 
banks 
As was argued above, banks will only grant loans in which the loan amount exceeds the 
potential costs of foreclosure and liquidation of collateral, in this case to enterprises with a 
minimum size of SE* for
min. The bank’s total costs function still represents the possible credit 
supply. Of course, here as well the bank will attempt – depending on market conditions – to 
charge higher interest rates within the contract area. 
                                                 
12   This does not have to be the case. However, if SE* for
min
 is smaller than SE for
min
, there is no binding constraint, 
and further analysis is superfluous. Figure 9 thus applies to all other cases.  
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Borrowers who demand loans which are smaller than SE* for
min are subject to credit rationing 
because they would have neither intrinsic nor extrinsic motivation to pay back their loans, and 
are thus unattractive customers for banks. Credit is rationed not only due to asymmetric 
information, but also as a result of the high costs of foreclosure and liquidation of collateral. 
Which of these two possible causes serves as the binding constraint, and thus determines 
precisely where the “frontier of formal finance”13 lies, must be decided separately for each 
individual case. 
5.  The credit supply of the formal and informal financial sectors 
In the preceding sections, arguments were presented to explain why banks exclude small 
and medium-sized enterprises from access to credit. However, this credit rationing in certain 
market segments becomes a problem only if there are no other institutions which can 
efficiently serve these market segments. To ascertain whether such institutions are in fact 
lacking, the supply function of informal lenders is presented and then compared with the 
credit supply provided by banks, following which the results of the comparison are analysed 
to determine the implications for the credit market as a whole. 
Informal lenders are not part of the formal financial system, and thus are unable to fund 
their lending activities on relatively attractive terms using credit facilities provided by the 
central bank and/or savings collected from the general public. Because they operate as 
disparate entities rather than as an integrated system, it is difficult for them to deal with 
liquidity mismatches; as a result, their liquidity management is inefficient and therefore 
costly. For these reasons, they must factor in very high funding costs when setting their 
prices.  
However, they have an advantage over conventional banks – namely, that they can assess 
the situation of “their” small borrowers with great precision, and thus are not confronted with 
the problem of asymmetric information to the same extent as banks. Moreover, they are often 
regarded by the potential borrowers as belonging to the same social environment as their 
customers, which significantly increases the borrowers’ intrinsic motivation to repay their 
loans, thereby reducing moral hazard problems. Although informal lenders are exposed to 
credit risk if a borrower becomes incapable of repaying his or her loan, they are able to assess 
this risk relatively well and thus pass on the resulting costs to their customers. Thus, credit 
risk assessment is not considered a problem, but is instead part of the business. In addition, 
their transaction costs are relatively low in comparison with those of conventional banks. 
                                                 
13   Cf. VON PISCHKE, 1991.  
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In Figure 10, these points have been incorporated into the graph which was elaborated in 
the preceding section. The risk costs (c
risk) can be assessed by informal lenders and are 
independent of the size of the enterprise; these are added to the costs of funds, iinf
fund , which are 
already relatively high. By then adding the transaction costs, which, as in the formal sector, 
are proportionally higher for very small credits than for “larger” loans, one arrives at the total 
cost curve for informal lenders which, as an analogue to the cost curve of the banks, 
represents the minimum interest rates which moneylenders would have charge to break even, 
given a particular loan amount or size of enterprise.  
 
 
Fig. 10:  The credit supply functions of the formal and informal financial sectors 
In this graph as well, there is a second contract area which lies between the cost curve of 
the informal sector lenders and the RoI of the enterprises, and which defines the range of 
possible interest rates in the informal credit market. It is apparent that all enterprises of a size 
between SEinf
min and SE inf
max will have access to informal credit. In contrast to the formal credit 
market, credit rationing i n the informal market does not occur as a consequence of 
information and incentive problems; however, borrowing simply does not make economic 
sense for enterprises which are smaller than SEinf
min or larger than SEinf
max, as they would have to 
pay interest rates above their potential RoI.  
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Conclusions 
The implications of the various phenomena outlined above for the credit market as a whole 
are as follows: relatively small enterprises whose size ranges between SE inf
min and SEinf
max can 
obtain financing in the informal credit market (at high interest rates), while larger enterprises 
can turn to the formal financial market to procure capital at comparatively low interest rates.  
The high interest rates prevailing in the informal sector may merely reflect the high cost of 
small loans. In the example shown in Figure 10, informal lenders actually have competitive 
advantages over the formal sector at nearly all points in this segment (with the exception of 
AF). However, this does not have to be the case; if the banks’ transaction costs were slightly 
lower, for example, their total costs curve would shift toward the origin. 
Because micro and small enterprises have a very high RoI, it is worthwhile for them to rely 
on expensive informal loans to finance their operations, at least until they reach the 
“maximum size” of SEinf
max. Once they have reached this size, however, it does not make 
economic sense for them to continue taking out informal credits, and thus they face a growth 
constraint imposed by the credit market. Internally financed growth does not take place 
because, given the entrepreneurs’ rates of time preference which are typically very high, 
surplus funds are used for other purposes, i.e. allocated to finance alternative investments or 
expenditures. Small enterprises will therefore not grow to become medium sized enterprises. 
The most important finding is that medium sized enterprises of a size between SE inf
max and 
SE for
min can borrow in neither of the two markets. They are too small – and thus unattractive – 
for formal-sector banks, and the interest rates in the informal sector would be higher than their 
RoI, i.e. borrowing would be irrational in economic terms for them. Medium-sized enterprises 
thus have no access to either formal- or informal-sector financing, which probably has a 
sustained negative effect on their competitiveness. Moreover, and perhaps much more 
importantly, the fact that they might forsee that they would run into a financing constraint if 
they grew to become medium sized enterprises will probably weaken their incentives to aspire 
growth in the first place.  
As a result, the credit market is segmented to one segment of small, informal enterprises 
with access only to informal loans, one segment of medium sized enterprises that do not gain 
access at credit at all, and one segment of large enterprises with access to bank loans. This 
segmentation is the result of a free market and not of any bureaucratic or legal restrictions. 
Thus credit market segmentation and the lack of financial institutions which tried to bridge 
this gap between the informal and the formal credit market can be regarded as a severe 
obstacle to economic development.14  
 
                                                 
14  How specialized microfinance institutions can bridge this gap is discussed in SCHMIDT/TSCHACH (2002).  
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Annex: The perspective of the borrower 
or: Average return vs. marginal return on capital 
In the paper, the analysis has focused on factors which the banks must consider when 
taking lending decisions. The banks are mainly concerned with the average RoI of enterprises 
as a criterion for assessing their ability to repay their loans, and as a consequence, the total 
capital productivity of the enterprises in question has formed the basis for the analysis in the 
paper. 
In contrast, when entrepreneurs need to decide whether to finance an additional investment 
with a loan, they will weigh their marginal return – i.e. the additional profits generated by 
their planned investments – against the marginal costs of taking out additional loans. These 
variables must therefore be incorporated into an analysis of credit demand.  
Figure A1 compares the average RoI of enterprises with their marginal capital 
productivity. Numeric values for the total assets of enterprises were entered so as to render the 
logarithmic scale of the X-axis somewhat more plausible. The marginal productivity curve 
intersects the X-axis at a value which is equivalent to half the value represented by the point 
of intersection of the average return curve. Given the logarithmic scale, however, the point of 
intersection of the marginal productivity curve does not actually lie midway between the Y-
axis and the average return curve. Instead, as shown, it is relatively close to the average return 
curve. The two curves are also parallel for the same reason. 
The marginal costs of additional loans will be lower than the average interest costs because 
the interest rate will also decrease for funds borrowed anyway. The difference between the 
average and marginal costs of loans will decrease as the loan amount increases because the 
interest rate for larger loans will no longer fall by as much. 
For small enterprises, the costs of financing an expansion through borrowing decrease 
more than their RoI, which is why a greater number of enterprises demand credit (represented 
by the area between A and G) in comparison to the number shown by an analysis based on 
average costs. However, as enterprises of this size are subject to credit rationing in any case, 
the extent of rationing merely increases. 
In contrast, demand on the part of large enterprises decreases with size. Starting at an 
amount of slightly less than US$ 10 million, financing an expansion with borrowed funds no 
longer makes economic sense. The contract area is reduced by the trapezoid HFBE (the banks 
continue to base their calculations on average values). However, this decline in demand for 
credit on the part of large enterprises has no impact on the analysis of credit market 
segmentation, as the latter occurs when small and medium-sized enterprises are subject to 
credit rationing.  
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Fig. A1:  Average and marginal return on capital 
Basing calculations on enterprises’ average return on capital will have different 
implications for and effects on the market than if marginal values are used. Average returns 
are the relevant variable for the banks’ calculations, while marginal values influence the credit 
demand of enterprises. In the market segments analysed in the paper, applying marginal 
values will result in a greater credit demand than is obtained when average values are used. 
However, the banks, which base their calculations on average values, subject the enterprises 
in question to credit rationing, and thus marginal values can be ignored in the discussion. At 
the same time, though, it should be borne in mind that the extent of credit demand, and thus of 
credit rationing, is always somewhat greater than an assessment based on average values 
would suggest. 
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